Research Vessel Operators’ Committee
SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE

Formed at RVOC Meeting, Newport, Rhode Island
25 October 2001.

Members:

RVOC Security Sub-Committee Purpose...

  • To consider the spectrum of potential security threats confronted by Academic Fleet Vessels,...
  • To establish contacts--and an ongoing liaison--with Navy, Coast Guard and law enforcement agencies for rapid access to information, advice and threat assessment,...
  • To participate in a dialogue with UNOLS Institutions and funding agencies while evaluating risks, missions, routing decisions, and options,...
  • To consider and recommend means by which the Fleet can enhance security & safety in response to a variety of threats.

Issues of Concern:

Piracy and Research Vessels

  • Hotspots are fairly predictable: Indonesia, Red Sea, Philippines, Columbia, Ecuador, Nigeria, etc.
  • Warnings are distributed well after the fact
  • Incidents have happened before (Calanus 1981, etc., Ewing 2001)
  • What’s changed since 9/11? We can’t assume mere robbery is the sole motive (It could be another ‘Cole’, an Abu Sayef hostage grab, or an attempt to seize a vessel to launch other attacks)

The terrorism threat includes:

  • Direct attack by small boat (or, when alongside a wharf, by boat, foot or vehicle)
  • Bomb and bio/chemical agent attack--an item smuggled aboard or delivered with science packages or ship stores
  • Hostage situations

Alongside Security (in Home and Foreign Ports) issues include:

  • Access Control during science personnel change-outs, provisioning, bunkering... Photo identification challenges at gangway
  • Package receipt control/verification
  • Stowaway searches before departure
  • Eliminate “sailing board:” ship movements to be provided on a “need-to-know” basis

Underway security and threat recognition...

  • Utilization of professional security teams during operations or transits in tense areas (Inventory and pre-screen firms offering this service)
  • Equipping and training for self defense (as per civilian-crewed MSC vessels)
  • Threat recognition and rules-of-engagement

RESOURCES

  • Open-source intelligence (newsletters, listservers, etc)--and the need to evaluate them as to quality and timeliness
  • Liaison with ONI, State Dept., USCG, agents, port law enforcement, Navy CiCs
  • Host nation resources--and evaluation as to reliability, trustworthiness of local officials
  • Communications, COMSEC & Crypto